Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) is a useful cryptographic primitive that combines the functionalities of bit commitment and oblivious transfer. In this paper, we introduce an extended version of COT (ECOT) which additionally allows proofs of relations among committed bits, and we construct an efficient protocol that securely realizes an ECOT functionality in the universalcomposability (UC) framework in the common reference string (CRS) model. Our construction is more efficient than previous (non-UC) constructions of COT, involving only a constant number of exponentiations and communication rounds. Using the ECOT functionality as a building block, we construct efficient UC protocols for general two-party and multi-party functionalities (in the CRS model), each gate requiring a constant number of ECOT's.
Introduction
Committed Oblivious Transfer (COT) was introduced by Crépeau [18] (under the name "Verifiable Oblivious Transfer") as a natural combination of 2 1 -Oblivious Transfer [22] and Bit Commitment. At the start of the computation Alice is committed to bits a 0 and a 1 and Bob is committed to bit b; at the end Bob is committed to a b and knows nothing about ab, while Alice learns nothing about b.
One can see that this allows each party engaged in an oblivious transfer to be certain that the other party is performing the oblivious transfer operation on their declared inputs. 1 This has been shown to be useful in [19] , who construct a protocol for general secure multi-party computation in the model of [28] using COT.
In this paper we show how to improve on previous constructions of COT in the areas of efficiency and universal composability. In terms of efficiency, the protocol we construct for COT uses only a constant number of exponentiations and communication rounds per transfer. 2 In contrast, the most efficient previously known construction of COT [19] uses O(k) invocations of OT (thus implying at least the same number of public-key operations using known constructions) and bit commitments, and O(k) rounds, for k a security parameter. Furthermore, we show that our protocol securely realizes an ideal COT functionality in the recently-proposed universal composability (UC) framework by Canetti [10] , in the common reference string (CRS) model. Recall that to define security in this framework, one first specifies an "ideal functionality" describing the desired behavior of the protocol using a trusted party, and then one proves that a particular protocol operating in the real world "securely realizes" this ideal functionality, by showing that no "environment" would be able to distinguish (1) an adversary operating in the real world with parties running this protocol from (2) an "ideal adversary" operating in an ideal process consisting of dummy parties that simply call the ideal functionality. A main virtue of this framework is that the security of protocols thus defined is preserved under a general composition operation called "universal composition," which essentially means that protocols remain secure even when composed with other protocols that may be running concurrently in the same system. We give a more detailed review of the UC framework later in the paper. We note that a similar framework was independently proposed by Pfitzmann and Waidner [37, 38] . Intuitively, these two frameworks are similar, although there are a number of technical differences. We choose to use the UC framework in this paper. 3 Our protocol actually realizes an enhanced COT functionality, which we call ECOT, where in addition to oblivious transfer, one can prove certain relations among committed bits (in particular, among three bits). To demonstrate the usefulness of this functionality, we show that using ECOT as a building block, any well-formed two-party and multi-party functionality can be securely realized efficiently in the universal composability framework. Plugging in our protocol for realizing the ECOT into this construction, we have an efficient protocol for any well-formed two-party and multi-party functionality in the CRS model.
Canetti et al. [12] were the first to show that such functionalities are indeed realizable in this model, even under general cryptographic assumptions and regardless of the number of corrupted parties. More specifically, [12] follows the general "two-phase" approach of [27] of first designing a solution for the case of honest-but-curious parties, and then turning it into a solution for the actively malicious adversary, using a "compiler." The compiler adds a zero-knowledge proof to every message, proving that it is consistent with the history and the (committed) private input and the randomness. Notice that since the "consistency" proofs are for relations involving the execution of Turing machines, they are quite complex and it is unlikely that they admit efficient protocols; rather, proofs for general NP statements are used (which involve a reduction to an NP-complete problem like Hamiltonian Cycle), making the compiler a major source of inefficiency. Canetti et al. make the protocol in [27] secure in the UC framework by replacing the basic primitives (namely, oblivious transfer, bit commitment, and zero-knowledge) with their universally composable counterparts. The resultant protocol becomes universally composable, but remains rather inefficient. In this paper we follow a different approach. By incorporating stronger security into the basic building block (i.e., ECOT), we are able to build protocols secure against adaptive and malicious adversaries directly, eliminating the need for a (normally inefficient) compiler. In this way, we are able to construct protocols that are efficient and at the same time enjoy a high level of security.
Our results. We now present a more detailed account of our results. We start by defining an ECOT functionality (F ECOT ), which, as mentioned above, additionally allows the sender to prove relations on three committed bits to the receiver. Then we construct a protocol to realize the ECOT functionality. The starting point for our construction is the standard Pedersen commitment scheme [35] . Then we build an OT protocol over these commitments that is loosely based on the (non-concurrent version of the) OT protocol of Garay and MacKenzie [24] (which in turn is based on the OT protocol of Bellare and Micali [4] ). Zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs are required in this OT protocol, and thus we work in a hybrid model with ideal ZK functionalities. Naturally, the constructions for proving relations on three committed bits also use these ideal ZK functionalities. Finally, to construct efficient protocols that securely realize these ZK functionalities, we construct a special type of honest-verifier ZK protocol for each desired relations, and then we use a result by Garay et al. [25] that shows how to convert this special type of honest-verifier ZK protocol into a universally-composable ZK protocol. These results are presented in Section 3.
The ECOT functionality can be naturally extended into one that performs ) and proves relations on four committed bits (as opposed to three). We call this extended functionality F 4 ECOT , and show how to construct it using the original F ECOT functionality as a building block. Equipped with F 4 ECOT , we then show how to securely realize a two-party functionality that we call Joint Gate Evaluation (F JGE ), which, as its name indicates, allows two parties to securely compute any Boolean function over two bits shared between them. Essentially, the protocol realizing this functionality uses a construction similar to that of [27] for the computation of the multiplication gate. However, distinctive features of the protocol are that it deals directly with adaptively malicious parties, and its efficiency: only a constant number of exponentiations and communication rounds per gate evaluation. Joint Gate Evaluation is presented in Section 4.
Finally, we use F JGE to securely realize -efficiently -any adaptively well-formed two-party and multi-party functionality, which is expressed by a boolean circuit, in a universally-composable way. Again, since the realization is directly for the actively malicious adversary, and by means of an efficient building block, the overall computational complexity is a small constant times the number of gates in the representation of the functionality, and the number of rounds is a constant times the depth of the circuit. The treatment of two-party functionalities is presented in Section 5, while the case of multi-party functionalities, with the one-to-many extensions and realizations of the required building blocks, is discussed in Section 6. Putting everything together, we construct efficient and universally composable two-party and multi-party computation protocols that are secure against adaptive adversaries in the erasing model, where we allow parties to erase certain information reliably.
As a technical note, we use the gate-by-gate approach from [27] , and make sure that each gate is computed efficiently. We do not use the "encrypted circuit" approach due to Yao [40] , which yields constant-round protocols but is rather inefficient in terms of communication complexity, since one needs to prove in zero-knowledge that the encrypted circuit is correct and these proofs are unlikely to admit efficient protocols.
Related work. We already mentioned prior work on COT [18, 19] . Although the protocols presented there are generic and hence may be implemented with or without computational assumptions (e.g., using primitives based on quantum channels), they are less efficient by at least a factor of k, where k is the security parameter, and furthermore, they are not universally composable. (As a side note, a "stand-alone" version of our ECOT protocol would be substantially simpler, in particular with respect to the implementation of the necessary ZK proofs.)
We can also compare the ECOT functionality to the functionalities defined in [12] , who use a "twophase" approach to construct universally composable two-party/multiple-party computation protocols. In the first phase, where they construct a protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries, an important tool is the OT functionality. In the second phase, where they exhibit a "compiler" that turns protocols in the first phase into ones secure against malicious adversaries, an important tool is the "commitand-prove" functionality, which proves general NP statements. In some sense, the ECOT functionality may be viewed as a "combination" of the OT functionality and the commit-and-prove functionality. However, we stress that since ECOT only needs to prove very simple relations (among three bits), it can be realized more efficiently. 4 Recently, Damgård and Nielsen [21] presented efficient universally composable multi-party computation protocols using a different approach. Their construction is based on an efficient MPC protocol by Cramer et al. [15] , which in turn is based on threshold homomorphic cryptosystems. Compared to our result, the Damgård-Nielsen construction works in a slightly stronger model, namely the public key infrastructure (PKI) model, where a trusted party not only generates a common reference string (which contains the public keys of all the paries), but also a private string for each party (as the party's secret key). On the other hand, their protocol is secure against adaptive adversaries in the so-called non-erasing model, where the parties are not allowed to erase any information, while our construction is secure in the erasing model only.
Preliminaries and Definitions
All our results are in the common reference string (CRS) model, which assumes that there is a string uniformly generated from some distribution and is available to all parties at the start of a protocol. This is a generalization of the public random string model, where a uniform distribution over fixedlength bit strings is assumed.
For a distribution ∆, we say a ∈ ∆ to denote any element that has non-zero probability in ∆, i.e., any element in the support of ∆. We say a R ← ∆ to denote a is randomly chosen according to distribution ∆. For a set S, we say a R ← S to denote that a is uniformly drawn from S.
The universal composability framework. The universal composability framework was suggested by Canetti for defining the security and composition of protocols [10] . In this framework one first defines an "ideal functionality" of a protocol, and then proves that a particular implementation of this protocol operating in a given computational environment securely realizes this ideal functionality. The basic entities involved are n players P 1 , . . . , P n , an adversary A, and an environment Z. The real execution of a protocol π, run by the players in the presence of A and an environment machine Z, with input z, is modeled as a sequence of activations of the entities. The environment Z is activated first, generating in particular the inputs to the other players. Then the protocol proceeds by having A exchanging messages with the players and the environment. Finally, the environment outputs one bit, which is the output of the protocol.
The security of the protocols is defined by comparing the real execution of the protocol to an ideal process in which an additional entity, the ideal functionality F, is introduced; essentially, F is an incorruptible trusted party that is programmed to produce the desired functionality of the given task. Let S denote the adversary in this idealized execution. The players are replaced by dummy players, who do not communicate with each other; whenever a dummy player is activated, its input is forwarded to F by S, who can see the "public header" of the input. 5 As in the real-life execution, the output of the protocol execution is the one-bit output of Z. Now a protocol π securely realizes an ideal functionality F if for any real-life adversary A there exists an ideal-execution adversary S such that no environment Z, on any input, can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A and players running π in the real-life execution, or with S and F in the ideal execution. More precisely, if the two binary distribution ensembles, REAL π,A,Z and IDEAL F ,S,Z , describing Z's output after interacting with adversary A and players running protocol π (resp., adversary S and ideal functionality F), are computationally indistinguishable (denoted REAL π,A,Z c ≈ IDEAL F ,S,Z ).
by Damgård and Nielsen [20] , along with efficient protocols realizing it under some specific number-theoretic assumptions. However, it was not shown that their functionality could be used in constructing protocols for general secure multi-party computation, and more specifically, oblivious transfer. 5 This feature was added to the UC framework in [12] .
Protocols typically invoke other sub-protocols. In this framework the hybrid model is like a reallife execution, except that some invocations of the sub-protocols are replaced by the invocation of an instance of an ideal functionality F; this is called the "F-hybrid model." Let HYB F π,A,Z denote the distribution ensemble of random variables describing the output of Z, after interacting in the F-hybrid model with protocol π. Let π be a protocol in the F-hybrid model, and ρ a protocol that secures realizes F. The composed protocol π ρ is now constructed by replacing the first message to F in π by an invocation of a new copy of ρ, with fresh random input, the same sid, and with the contents of that message as input; each subsequent message to that copy of F is replaced with an activation of the corresponding copy of ρ, with the contents of that message as new input to ρ.
The UC composition theorem basically says that if ρ secure realizes F in the G-hybrid model, for some functionality G, then an execution of the composed protocol π ρ , running in the G-hybrid model, "emulates" an execution of protocol π in the F-hybrid model. That is, no environment machine Z can distinguish whether it is interacting with A and π ρ in the G-hybrid model, or it is interacting with S and π in the F-hybrid model. In other words, HYB
We are designing and analyzing protocols in the CRS model, and so they will be operating in the F D CRS -hybrid model, where F D CRS is the functionality that chooses a string from distribution D k and hands it to all parties. Further, we will consider the "multi-session extension of F" of Canetti and Rabin [13] , denotedF , which runs multiple copies of F by identifying each copy by a special sub-session identifier.
The definition ofF R ZK , the multi-session extension of F R ZK , is shown below. Note the two types of indices: the sid, which differentiates messages toF R ZK from messages sent to other functionalities, and ssid, the sub-session identifier, which is unique per input message (or proof).
ZK proceeds as follows, running with security parameter k, parties P 1 , . . . , P n , and an adversary S:
• Upon receiving (zk-prover, sid, ssid, P i , P j , x, w) from P i : If R(x, w) then send (ZK-PROOF, sid, ssid, P i , P j , x) to P j and S and halt. Otherwise, ignore.
Refer to [10, 12] for further description of the UC framework.
Ω-protocols
Our constructions will use a special type of zero-knowledge protocols, namely, Ω-protocols [25] , which are variants of the so-called Σ-protocols [16, 14] . We review some of the definitions and properties of these protocols. Let R = {(x, w)} be a binary relation and assume that for some given polynomial p(·) it holds that |w| ≤ p(|x|) for all (x, w) ∈ R. Furthermore, let R be testable in polynomial time. Let L R = {x : (x, w) ∈ R} be the language defined by the relation, and for all x ∈ L R , let W R (x) = {w : (x, w) ∈ R} be the witness set for x. For any NP language L, note that there is a natural witness relation R containing pairs (x, w) where w is the witness for the membership of x in L, and that L R = L.
A Σ-protocol (A, B) is a three move interactive protocol between a probabilistic polynomial-time prover A and a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier B, where the prover acts first. The verifier is only required to send random bits as a challenge to the prover. For some (x, w) ∈ R, the common input to both players is x while w is private input to the prover. For such given x, let (a, c, z) denote the conversation between the prover and the verifier. To compute the first and final messages, the prover invokes efficient algorithms a(·) and z(·), respectively, using (x, w) and random bits as input. Using an efficient predicate φ(·), the verifier decides whether the conversation is accepting with respect to x. The relation R, the algorithms a(·), z(·) and φ(·) are public. The length of the challenges is denoted t B , and we assume that t B only depends on the length of the common string x.
We will need to broaden this definition slightly, to deal with cheating provers. We will defineL R to be the input language, with the property that L R ⊆L R , and membership inL R may be tested in polynomial time. We implicitly assume B only executes the protocol if the common input x ∈L R .
All Σ-protocols presented here will satisfy the following security properties:
• Weak special soundness: Let (a, c, z) and (a, c , z ) be two conversations, that are accepting for some given x ∈L R . If c = c , then x ∈ L R . The pair of accepting conversations (a, c, z) and (a, c , z ) with c = c is called a collision .
• Special honest verifier zero knowledge (SHVZK): There is a (probabilistic polynomial time) simulator M that on input x ∈ L R generates accepting conversations with the exact same distribution as when A and B execute the protocol on common input x (and A is given a witness w for x), and B indeed honestly chooses its challenges uniformly at random. The simulator is special in the sense that it can additionally take a random string c as input, and output an accepting conversation for x where c is the challenge. In fact, we will assume the simulator has this special property for not only x ∈ L R , but also any x ∈L R .
An Ω-protocol (A, B) [σ] for a relation R = {(x, w)} and CRS σ, is a Σ-protocol for relation R except for the following.
1. For a given distribution ensemble D, a common reference string σ is drawn from D k and each function a(·), z(·), and φ(·) takes σ as an additional input.
2. It is computational SHVZK, meaning that the simulator on input x ∈ L R generates a conversation that is only computationally indistinguishable from one generated in a real execution between A and B on common input x 6 . Specifically, there is a negligible function α(k) and a polynomial-time simulator S such that for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adver-
where the experiments Expt A (k) and Expt S A (k) are defined as follows:
3. There exists a polynomial-time extractor E = (E 1 , E 2 ) such that the reference string output by
exists two accepting conversations (a, c, z) and (a, c , z ) with c = c for some given x ∈L R , then E 2 (x, τ, (a, c, z)) outputs w such that (x, w) ∈ R. 7 Intuitively, Ω-protocols are proof of knowledge protocols with a straight-line extractor.
In our results to follow, we need a particular, simple instance of the main theorem from [16] . Specifically, we use a slight generalization of a corollary in [16] which enables a prover, given two relations (R 1 , R 2 ), values (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈L R 1 ×L R 2 , and corresponding 3-move Σ-protocols ((A 1 , B 1 ), (A 2 , B 2 )), to present a 3-move Σ-protocol (A or , B or ) for proving the existence of a w such that either (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 or (x 2 , w) ∈ R 2 . We call this the "OR" protocol for ((A 1 , B 1 ), (A 2 , B 2 )),
We will describe the protocol assuming the challenges from (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) are of the same length. This can easily be generalized, as long as the challenge length in the combined protocol is at least as long as the challenges from either protocol. The protocol consists of (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ) running in parallel, but with the verifier's challenge c split into c = c 1 ⊕ c 2 , with c 1 as the challenge for (A 1 , B 1 ), and c 2 as the challenge for (A 2 , B 2 ).
The protocol for A or is as follows: Without loss of generality, say A or knows w such that (x 1 , w) ∈ R 1 . Let M 2 be the simulator for S 2 . Then A or runs M 2 (x 2 ) to generate (m, e, z). It sends the first message of (A 1 , B 1 ), along with m as the first message of (A 2 , B 2 ). On challenge c, it chooses c 2 = e, and c 1 = c ⊕ c 2 . It is able to provide the final response in (A 1 , B 1 ) because it knows w, and the final response in (A 2 , B 2 ) is simply z. The final message of A or includes c 1 along with the final responses for (A 1 , B 1 ) and (A 2 , B 2 ). We note that this construction works for Ω-protocols as well as Σ-protocols.
Universally Composable Committed Oblivious Transfer
In this section we present the F ECOT functionality, an extension of COT where in addition to the oblivious transfer, the sender can prove to the receiver (Boolean) relations among the committed bits. We will later use this functionality to implement an efficient Joint Gate Evaluation functionality, which in turn will enable efficient and universally composable multi-party computation. The functionality F ECOT is shown in Figure 1 . Informally, a party P i commits to a bit b by sending an ecot-commit message to the ideal functionality F ECOT , and P i can later open this bit by sending an ecot-open message with appropriate commitment identifier (cid) value. For P i to obliviously transfer a bit to P j , P i needs to commit two bits b 0 and b 1 and P j needs to commit to one bit b t ; after sending an ecot-transfer to F ECOT , the bit b bt is transferred to P j and automatically committed by F ECOT on behalf of P j . Meanwhile, P i does not learn anything, except that a transfer took place. Furthermore, the functionality also allows a party P i to prove to P j that three bits b 0 , b 1 , and b 2 it committed to satisfy a particular binary relation by sending an ecot-prove message to F ECOT .
As a convention, we use op (2) m to denote a function on two bits, where m ∈ {0, 1} 4 is the string of bits of the Boolean function's truth table (output column). We also often identify m with the integer whose binary representation is m. (For example, m = 1 represents the AND function, whose truth table is 0001.)
As a technical note, we note that the Open phase is not strictly necessary since it can be simulated by the Prove phase. Take op (2) 0000 and op (2) 1111 , which correspond to the all-zero and all-one functions. Then, by proving that op (2) 0000 (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 for arbitrary bits b 0 and b 1 , one essentially opens bit b 2 to 0; similarly, by proving that op (2) 1111 (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 , one opens b 2 to 1. We choose to include the Open phase in the functionality for clarity and efficiency (the Open phase can be realized more efficiently than the simulated Prove phase).
Before presenting a protocol that securely realizes F ECOT , we first discuss some preliminary constructions that will be used as building blocks.
Functionality F ECOT F ECOT proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n and an adversary S.
• Commit phase:
When receiving from P i a message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b , record cid, P i , P j , b , send message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j to P i , P j and S, and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , * from P i and ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , P i from P j .
• Prove phase:
When receiving from P i a message ecot-prove, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P j , m , if the following three tuples, cid 0 , P i , P j , b 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , b 1 , cid 2 , P i , P j , b 2 , are all recorded, and op (2) m (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 , then send message ECOT-PROOF, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P i , m to P j and S; otherwise do nothing.
• Transfer phase:
When receiving from P i a message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P j , if the following three tuples cid 0 , P i , P j , b 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , b 1 , and tcid, P j , P i , b t , are all recorded, send message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, b bt to P j , record tuple cid, P j , P i , b bt , and send message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid to P i and S, and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P i , * from P i and ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , P j from P j . Otherwise, do nothing.
• Open phase:
When receiving from P i a message ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P j , if the tuple cid, P i , P j , b is recorded, send message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b to both S and P j ; otherwise, do nothing. 
Building blocks
In particular, we shall discuss an Ω-protocol DL for discrete log, an Ω-protocol PEREP for partial equality of representation, and their compositions.
An Ω-protocol for discrete logarithm. In the full version of their paper, Garay et al. [25] presented an Ω-protocol for the discrete logarithm relation. More concretely, let (p, q, g) be public parameters, where q and p are primes satisfying q|(p − 1) and g ∈ Z * p with order(g) = q. Let R be the discrete logarithm relation R = {(y, x) : y ≡ g x mod p}. They constructed an Ω-protocol for the relation R. We use a slight variant of this protocol for a different relation R , which differs from R by moving g from the public parameter to the input. In other words, R DL = {((y, g), x) : y ≡ g x mod p}. We call our protocol DL(y, g) and present it in Appendix B for completeness.
An Ω-protocol for partial equality of representation. The protocol DL can be extended to one for proving partial equality of representation. Let (p, q) be public parameters, where q and p are primes satisfying q|(p − 1). Let R be the following relation
where g 0 , g 1 , g 2 , and g 3 all have order q. We construct an Ω-protocol for this relation and we call it
Intuitively, this is a proof of knowledge of presentations of x 0 over bases (g 0 , g 1 ) and x 1 over bases (g 2 , g 3 ) such that the exponent of x 0 over g 0 equals the exponent of x 1 over g 2 . The intuition behind this protocol is very similar to that of DL(y, g). The common reference string consists a Paillier public key and additional RSA modulus with three generators. The prover sends over the the encryption of α, β, γ (the representations) using the Paillier encryption key and then prove that these encryptions are correct. The additional RSA modulus are used to resolve the different moduli problem. This is a standard technique [6, 8, 23, 31, 25] . We include the protocol in Appendix B.
We omit the proof of this lemma since the techniques are rather standard.
Composition of Ω-protocols and conversion to UCZK protocols. As we discussed in Section 2, since Ω-protocols are special Σ-protocols, they admit efficient monotone compositions. In particular, there exist efficient Ω-protocols for proving any "AND" and "OR" compositions of the discrete log relations R DL and the partial equality of representation relations R PEREP .
In [25] , Garay et al. introduced a technique to transform any Ω-protocol into a universally composable protocol by using a digital signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Their transformation is efficient, if the digital signature scheme admits an efficient proof of knowledge protocol. In particular, they proved the following result. ( See Appendix A for discussion on the Strong RSA assumption.) Therefore, we can plug in the Ω-protocols for proving discrete logarithm, partial equality of representation, and their "AND"/"OR" compositions into Theorem 3.3 and obtain efficient UCZK protocols for these relations. In particular, we shall use UCZK protocols for proving the following relations.
1. "OR" of two discrete logs:
2. "OR"/"AND" relation of six discrete logs:
3. Partial equality of representations:
4. "OR" of partial equality of representations:
The UCECOT protocol
We now present UCECOT, a protocol that securely realizes the F ECOT ideal functionality in the (F CRS ,F
)-hybrid model, where the CRS consists of (p, q, g, h) such that q and p are primes satisfying q|(p − 1) and g, h ∈ Z * p are random elements satisfying order(g) = order(h) = q. p and q will also serve as the public parameters in the relations R DL , R PEREP , and their compositions.
We first describe the protocol.
Commit phase: On receiving private input ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b , assuming that cid is not used before, party P i picks a random r
, and outputs ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j . After receiving the messages from P i andF
respectively, P j outputs ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j .
Essentially P i sends a Pedersen commitment [35] of bit b to P j and uses theF R OR-DL ZK ideal functionality to prove that he either knows the discrete log of B (in which case P i is committing to bit 0) or the discrete log of B/h base g (in which case P i is committing to bit 1).
Prove phase: Suppose P i has committed bits b 0 , b 1 , and b 2 to P j using cids cid 0 , cid 1 , and cid 2 , respectively. Further assume that their corresponding Pedersen commitments are
, and B 2 = g r 2 ·h b 2 . Now, upon receiving private input ecot-prove, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P j , m , P i is to prove to P j that op (2) m (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 , using sub-session id ssid. We first consider the situation where m = 1110, in which case op (2) m is the NAND operation. In this situation, P i sends message (ucecot-prove, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , m) to P j and sends message (zk-prover, sid, ssid,
. After receiving the corresponding message fromF
In the case of any other binary operations op (2) m , it can be written as a composition of NANDs and then proved step by step. P i will need to commit to all the intermediate bits and prove each NAND operation is correct. For example, consider the case where m = 0001 is the AND operation. Notice that x ∧ y = x ∧ y ∧ x ∧ y Therefore, to prove that b 2 = b 0 ∧ b 1 , P i needs to commit to a new bit b 3 = b 0 ∧ b 1 using the protocol in the Commit phase, and then prove that both
Transfer phase: Suppose P i has committed bits b 0 and b 1 , and P j has committed bit b t , using identifiers cid 0 , cid 1 , and tcid, respectively. Further assume that the corresponding Pedersen commitments are B 0 = g r 0 · h b 0 , B 1 = g r 1 · h b 1 , and B t = g rt · h bt . Now, upone receiving private input ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P j , assuming that cid is not used before, P i is to obliviously transfers bit b bt to P j , using session id sid and the commitment id cid for the new bit b bt . Intuitively, P i sends two Pedersen commitments, C 0 and C 1 , where C 0 is a commitment to b 0 using base B t , and C 1 is a commitment to b 1 using base B t /h. It also sends A 0 and A 1 generated using the same randomness as C 0 and C 1 . If b t = 0, then P j knows the discrete log of B t and can check if C 0 is a commitment to zero or not, and if b t = 1, then P j knows the discrete log of B t /h and can check if C 1 is a commitment to zero or not.
Now we proceed to the details. P i randomly picks a 0 , a 1
to P j and sends the following four messages to the ideal functionalitŷ F
After this, P i erases a 0 and a 1 .
After receiving the message from P i and four messages from the ideal functionalityF Next, P j picks a random r R ← Z * q and sets B ← g r ·h b mod p, sends message (ecot-commit, sid, cid, B) to party P i , sends message (zk-prover, sid, cid, P j ,
, and outputs ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, b . Finally, after receiving messages from P j andF
Open phase: Suppose P i has committed a bit b to P j using session id sid, and commitment id cid.
Further assume that the commitment is B = g r · h b mod p. Now upon receiving private input ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P j , P i opens the bit b by sending message (ucecot-open, sid, cid, b, r) to P j , who then verifies that B = g r · h b mod p, and outputs (ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b) if the verification is valid. This is exactly the opening of a Pedersen commitment.
Theorem 3.4
Under the DDH assumption, protocol UCECOT securely realizes the F ECOT ideal functionality in the (F CRS ,F
)-hybrid model against adaptive, malicious adversaries, assuming erasing.
Proof: Let A be an adversary that operates against protocol UCECOT. We construct an ideal process adversary S such that no environment Z can distinguish whether it is interacting with A and UCECOT in the (F CRS ,F
)-hybrid model, or with S in the ideal process for F ECOT .
For simplicity, we assume that only one copy of F ECOT is access by Z, since otherwise we can easily duplicate the actions for S for each copy of F ECOT .
At the beginning of the ideal process, the ideal adversary S simulates the common reference string F CRS . First, S generate two primes p and q of appropriate size such that q|(p − 1). Next S generates random g ∈ Z * p such that order(g) = q, a random t R ← Z q , and h ← g t . Then S outputs (p, q, g, h) as the common reference string for F CRS and stores t. Notice that since S knows the discrete log of h base g, it can equivocate the Pedersen commitment.
During the ideal process, S runs a simulated copy of A. Messages received from Z are forwarded to the simulated A, and messages sent by the simulated A to its environment are forwarded to Z. S also see the public header (see [12] ) of all the messages from uncorrupted parties to F ECOT and may decide whether or not to forward these messages. In the case of F ECOT , all messages to F ECOT are in the public header (meaning that S can see all these messages from uncorrupted parties to F ECOT ) except the bit b in the ecot-commit message. We use "−" to denote this private bit. Furthermore, S also plays the roles of the four UCZK functionalitiesF
Furthermore, S maintains a record of committed bits erased in F ECOT . The record consists of tuples of the form (cid, P i , P j , B, r, b), indicating that the committed bit of id cid is from P i to P j , the bit is b and the Pedersen commitment is B = h b · g r . If P i is uncorrupted, then the bit b is set to "?," indicating that S can equivocate on this one and in this case, B = g r .
Next, we describe the behavior of S in detail. S is "event-driven," in that its actions are triggered by the messages. We itemize the behavior of S according to the messages it sees.
1. If S sees a corrupted party P i send a message (ucecot-commit, sid, cid, B) to party P j , this means that P i (which is controlled by A) is committing a bit to P j . Then S expects a message (zk-prover, sid, cid, P i , P j , (B, g, B/h, g), (r 0 , r 1 )) from P i toF
. After receiving this message, S checks if B = g r 0 and if B/h = g r 1 . If neither holds, S ignores this message, since P i fails the proof. If both hold, then A manages to find out the discrete log of h (which is r 0 − r 1 ), and S in this case aborts and outputs an error message ''DL broken:
then P i is committing to the bit b = 1. In either case, S records (cid, P j , P i , B, r b , b) and sends message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b to on behalf of P i to F ECOT .
2. If S sees a message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , − from an uncorrupted party P i to F ECOT , this means that P i is committing a bit to P j . Notice that S cannot see the actual bit b in the message, and the place of b is filled by "−." S then forwards this message to the F ECOT , and obtains a receipt ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j in return. Next, S fakes a Pedersen commitment by picking a random r R ← Z q , setting B ← g r , and sending message (ucecot-commit, sid, cid, B) to party P j . and records (cid, P i , P j , B, r, ?). S also forges a message (ZK-PROOF, sid, cid, P i , P j , (B, g, B/h, g)) fromF R OR-DL ZK to P j . Notice that if P j is corrupted, then the messages to P j are in fact directed to A.
3. If S sees a corrupted party P i (controlled by A) send a message (ucecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 ) to an uncorrupted party P j , this means that P i (controlled by A) is performing an oblivious transfer to P j . In this case, S first verifies the it has stored three tuples
, and (tcid, P j , P i , B t , r t , ?), and does nothing if not. Next, S plays the ideal functionalityF
to receive four messages from P i , and verifies that
If α 00 = b 0 , S aborts and outputs ''DL broken:
If β 01 = b 0 , S aborts and outputs ''DL broken:
If β 11 = b 1 , S aborts and outputs ''DL broken: h = g r 2 ·(α 11 −β 10 )/(α 11 +β 11 −β 10 −b1) .''
Otherwise, we have α 00 = β 01 = b 0 , α 10 = β 11 = b 1 , α 02 = r 0 , α 12 = r 1 , β 00 = α 01 , and β 10 = α 11 . Setting a 0 = α 01 and a 1 = α 11 , we see that (A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 ) is indeed of the form as prescribed in protocol UCECOT.
After this, S sends message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P j to F ECOT , and waits for the message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid back from it. Next, S fakes a commitment by setting r R ← Z q , B ← g r , and sending the message (ecot-commit, sid, cid, B) to P i , and forges a message (ZK-PROOF, sid, cid, P j , P i , (C 0 , h, A 0 , B, h, g, C 1 , h, A 1 , B, h, g) ) from F R OR-PEREP ZK to P i . 4 . If S sees a message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P j from an uncorrupted party P i to F ECOT , this means that P i is transferring a bit to P j obliviously. If P j is uncorrupted, then S can simulate the protocol easily. In particular, it forwards this message to F ECOT , obtains a message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid in return from F ECOT , forges a message (ucecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 ) from P i to P j and then a message (ucecot-commit, sid, cid, B) from P j to P i , where A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 are generated as in the protocol (using b 0 = b 1 = 0) and B ← g r for a random r R ← Z q . S also simulates the appropriate messages to and from the UCZK ideal functionalitiesF
Now, consider the case that P j is corrupted. Assume that S has internally stored tuples (cid 0 , P i , P j , B 0 , r 0 , ?), (cid 1 , P i , P j , B 1 , r 1 , ?) and (tcid, P j , P i , B t , r t , b t ). If it is not the case, S does nothing. Otherwise S does the following. Intuitively, S can simulate the protocol correctly since it knows the bit b t used by the corrupted receiver, and it learns from F ECOT the transferred bit. It sets the data for the opposite case (1 − b t ) randomly, since the receiver should not learn anything about the data corresponding to 1 − b t . Below is the detailed description.
(a) Forward the message to F ECOT and obtains the message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, b in return.
(c) Send message (ucecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 ) to P j and simulate the four messages fromF
(d) Receive message (ecot-commit, sid, cid, B) from P j and message (zk-prover, sid, cid, P j , P i ,
we call it "event 1"). If none of the events happens, then stop and furthermore, ignore all ucecot-commit and ucecot-transfer messages from P j with cid as commitment id. 
''
(h) Otherwise, if b t = 0, then store tuple (cid, P j , P i , B, α 2 , b); otherwise store (cid, P j , P i , B, β 2 , b).
5. If S sees a message ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P j , m from an uncorrupted party P i to F ECOT , this means that P i is proving to P j that op
S then forwards this message to the F ECOT . Next, after receiving message ECOT-PROOF, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P i , m from F ECOT , S forges the various messages from the ZK functionalityF R OR-N-DL ZK to P j . For example, if m = 1110 (the NAND function), then S sends message (ZK-PROOF, sid, ssid, P i , P j , (B 0 , B 1 , B 2 /h, B 0 /h, B 1 /h, B 2 , g ) to P j , assuming that S has recorded tuples (cid 0 , P i , P j , B 0 , r 0 , ?), (cid 1 , P i , P j , B 1 , r 1 , ?) and (cid 2 , P i , P j , B 2 , r 2 , ?). For other m, multiple messages would be sent accordingly, in order to simulate the prove phase in protocol UCECOT. Again, if P j is corrupted, then the messages to P j are in fact directed to A.
6. If S sees a corrupted party P i send a message (ucecot-prove, sid, ssid, , cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , m) to P j , this means that P i (controlled by A) is proving to party P j about a binary relation for three bits. In this case, S checks if the tuples (cid 0 , P i , P j , B 0 , r 0 , b 0 ), (cid 1 , P i , P j , B 1 , r 1 , b 1 ) and (cid 2 , P i , P j , B 2 , r 2 , b 2 ) are all stored, and stops otherwise. Next, S receives further messages from P i to the ideal functionalityF
, verifies them. If all the proofs toF
are valid, which implies that op (2) m (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 , S then sends message ecot-prove, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P j , m to F ECOT ; otherwise do nothing.
7. If S sees a message ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P j from an uncorrupted party P i to F ECOT , this means that P i is opening a committed bit to P j . S checks for the stored tuple (cid, P i , P j , B, r, ?) and does nothing no such tuple is tored. Then S forwards this message to F ECOT and wait to receive the message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b back from it. Next, S sends message (ucecot-open, sid, cid, b, r − b · t) to P j . Here t is the discrete log of h base g. Again, if P j is corrupted, this message in fact goes to A.
8. If S sees that a corrupted party P i send a message (ucecot-open, sid, cid, b, r) to an uncorrupted party P j , this means that P i (controlled by A) is opening a bit to P j . In this situation, S checks the stored tuple (cid, P i , P j , B, r , b ). If B = h b · g r , then this is an invalid opening and S does nothing. Otherwise S checks if b = b . If it is not the case, S aborts and outputs an error message ''DL broken:
9. If A corrupts a party P i , S needs to simulate its internal state, which consists solely of the information to all the unopened commitments. When P i is corrupted, these committed bits are given to S. Now, since S knows the discrete log of h, it can open these commitments to any value. So S simply generates these openings by finding all the tuples of the form (cid, P i , * , B, r, ?), for each such tuple finding out the corresponding bit b from the corruption information, and producing r = r − b · t as the opening information. S also change the tuple (cid, P i , * , B, r, ?) to (cid, P i , * , B, r , b).
This finishes the description of S. Now, we show that
which implies our theorem. We first sketch the structure of the proof. We constructs a sequence of "mix" experiments between the experiment HYB and the experiment IDEAL, described in more detail below, such that the experiments on the two extremes are HYB and IDEAL Then, we prove that every two adjacent experiments are indistinguishable.
Mix 0 : All parties run the real protocol, and the ideal functionalities are run as specified. This is identical to experiment HYB
This experiment is the same as Mix 0 , except that when a corrupted sender performs a commitment or opening to an uncorrupted receiver, the tests from S are run. In particular, the experiment does the following: (1) using the values sent in the ZK proof of the commitment phase to either extract the committed bit or else abort with a ''DL broken'' error message, and (2) to verify that the same bit is used in the open phase, or else aborts with a ''DL broken'' error message.
This experiment is the same as Mix 1 , except that when a corrupted sender performs a transfer to an uncorrupted receiver, the tests from S are run. In particular, the experiment does the following: using the values sent in the ZK proof of the transfer phase to either verify that the bits transferred correspond to the previously committed bits, or else abort with a ''DL broken'' error message.
This experiment is the same as Mix 2 , except that when an uncorrupted sender performs a transfer to a corrupted receiver, it is simulated as in S, where the bit b being transferred is not taken from F ECOT , but instead is computed as b bt , where b t is the (previously extracted) bit of the receiver, and b 0 and b 1 are the bits of the sender. Also, note that in this simulation, using the values sent in the ZK proof of the receiver's commitment to b, it either extracts the committed bit or else aborts with a ''DL broken'' error message.
This experiment is the same as Mix 3 , except that (1) when an uncorrupted sender performs a proof to a corrupted receiver, the uncorrupted sender does not provide the verification information to the ideal ZK functionality, and S is used to forge the ZK-PROOF messages from the ZK functionality, and (2) when a corrupted sender performs a proof to an uncorrupted receiver, it verifies that the values submitted correspond to the values previously extracted for the commitments.
Mix 5 : This experiment is the same as Mix 4 , except that (1) F CRS is simulated as in S, so the value of log g h is known, and (2) when an uncorrupted sender makes a commitment (either in a commitment phase or as a receiver in the transfer phase) or opening, or is corrupted, it is simulated as in S (i.e., making commitments to zero, and then equivocating on an opening or a corruption). One can verify that this is now equivalent to the experiment IDEAL F ECOT ,S,Z , at least from the view of the adversary A. Notice that only in this final experiment does S needs to know log g h in order to equivocate the Pedersen commitment.
We prove a sequence of lemmas. We only sketch some of the proofs if they are standard. 
Proof:
The difference between Mix 0 and Mix 1 is that in Mix 1 , S extracts the committed bits. So the only possibility to distinguish Mix 0 from Mix 1 is when a corrupted party opens a commitment in two different ways. In this case Mix 1 aborts and outputs the message ''DL broken'' along with the value of log g h. If this does not happens with negligible probability, we can convert this experiment into an algorithm B that breaks the discrete log assumption. The conversion is standard: the algorithm B with input (X, Y ) runs the entire experiment, replacing the (g, h) in the common reference string by (X, Y ). Notice that in experiment Mix 1 , the knowledge of log g h is not needed. Therefore, B can carry out the experiment Mix 1 , and when Mix 1 aborts, B breaks the discrete log assumption.
Lemma 3.6 Under the discrete log assumption, Mix 1 c ≈ Mix 2 .
The difference between Mix 1 and Mix 2 is that when a corrupted party P i transfers a bit to an uncorrupted one P j , this happens in the real life model in Mix 1 , while in Mix 2 S is run to verify if the bits transfered correspond t the previous committed ones. Therefore, the only possibility to distinguish these two experiments is when Mix 2 aborts. As in the previous proof, any time S aborts, it finds out log g h, and thus if Mix 2 aborts with non-negligible probability, we can construct an adversary B that breaks the discrete log assumption by running Mix 2 . Also as in the previous proof, knowledge of log g h is not needed by Mix 2 . Proof: First, with the same reasoning as in the previous proof, we may assume that the probability that S aborts in Mix 3 is negligible, under the discrete log assumption, which is implied by DDH. Now, assuming that S never aborts, the only difference is that the tuple (A 0 , C 0 , A 1 , C 1 ) is generated differently in two cases. However, we shall prove that assuming DDH, these two cases are indistinguishable. From now on, we assume that b t = 0 for simplicity (the case for b t = 1 is similar). Then we have B t = g rt and b 0 = b.
In Mix 2 , the (A 0 , C 0 , A 1 , C 1 ) are generated as
In Mix 3 , they are generated as
It is easy to see that in both cases, (A 0 , C 0 ) are distributed identically, and are independent from (A 1 , C 1 ). So we now focus on (A 1 , C 1 ). In Mix 2 , the tuple (g, h,
Thus, if an environment Z can distinguish Mix 2 from Mix 3 , we can use it to build another adversary B that breaks the DDH assumption. This is a rather standard conversion: B receives a tuple (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) as input. It generates a random t ∈ Z q , use (x 0 , x 1 ) in the place of (g, h) in the common reference string, and carries out the experiment Mix 3 . In particular, B runs the environment Z and thus can see all the bits committed to; B also runs S and thus can see all the messages transmitted, as well as the internal random bits used by S.
Then B picks a random session where an uncorrupted party P i transfers a bit to a corrupted one P j . We use the notations in S, and so the bit committed by P j is b t with Pedersen commitment B t . The B replaces the tuple (A 0 , A 1 , C 0 , C 1 ) sent by the S to P j by (A 0 , x 2 , C 0 , (B t ) a 1 · h b 1 /x 3 ). If the tuple (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), is a random DH tuple, then the experiment is identical to Mix 2 ; if (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) is a random 4-tuple, then the experiment is identical to Mix 3 . Thus if the environment Z can distinguish Mix 2 from Mix 3 , B can break the DDH assumption. Proof: In Mix 4 , the commitments by uncorrupted parties are carried by themselves. In Mix 5 , S simulates these commitments without the knowledge of the actual bits committed to. In fact, S learns these bits only later, at the opening or when a party is corrupted. However, since S knows the discrete log, it can equivocate and open the commitment to arbitrary values. Thus, the lemma follows directly the fact that the Pedersen commitment is perfect hiding.
Summing everything up, we know that S is a valid ideal process adversary and therefore the UCECOT protocol securely realizes the F ECOT ideal functionality in the (F CRS ,F
Joint Gate Evaluation
In this section we show how to securely realize a two-party functionality that we call Joint Gate Evaluation (F JGE ) in the F ECOT -hybrid model in the presence of a malicious, adaptive adversary. Informally, F JGE allows two parties to jointly evaluate any binary operation on two bits, and this will allow us to construct general two-party computation protocols on top of F JGE . We first present the functionality, shown in Figure 2 .
Functionality F JGE
F JGE proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n , and adversary S.
When receiving from P i a message commit, sid, cid, P j , b , record cid, {P i , P j }, b , send message RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j to P i , P j and S, and ignore all further messages of the form commit, sid, cid, x, * and eval, sid, cid, * , * , x, * from P j or P j , where x ∈ {P i , P j }.
• Evaluate phase: When receiving from P i a message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P j , m , if
, send message EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , m to P i , P j and S, and ignore all further messages of the form commit, sid, cid, x, * and eval, sid, cid, * , * , x, * from P i or P j , where x ∈ {P i , P j }. Otherwise, do nothing.
When receiving from P i a message open, sid, cid, P j , if the tuple cid, {P i , P j }, b is recorded, then send message DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b to P j ; otherwise, do nothing. At a high level, the approach we will use to realize functionality F JGE is similar to that in [26, 12] . In particular, each bit stored in F JGE will be XOR-shared by P i and P j , and each gate evaluation will be done by a 4 1 -oblivious transfer. However, our resulting construction is directly secure against a malicious, adaptive adversary, and therefore we do not need the "compiler" used in [26, 12] . This "direct" (as opposed to the "two-phase") approach makes our protocol much more efficient.
In particular, we will realize the F JGE functionality using a further generalization of the F ECOT functionality, which we call F 4 ECOT . The Commit and Open phases of F 4 ECOT are identical to those of F ECOT , but the Transfer phase performs a We now present F 4 ECOT in Figure 3 . We use op (3) m to express a Boolean function of three bits, where m ∈ {0, 1} 8 denotes the output bits of the Boolean function's truth table.
ECOT proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n and an adversary S:
• Commit phase: When receiving from P i a message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b , record cid, P i , P j , b , send message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j to P i , P j and S, and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , * from P i and ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , * , * , P i from P j .
When receiving from P i a message ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , cid 3 , P j , m , if the following four tuples cid 0 , P i , P j , b 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , b 1 , cid 2 , P i , P j , b 2 , and cid 3 , P i , P j , b 3 , are all recorded, and op
, then send message ECOT-PROOF, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , cid 3 , P i , m to P j and S; otherwise do nothing.
When receiving from P i a message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , cid 3 , tcid 0 , tcid 1 , P j , if the following six tuples
are all recorded, then record cid, P j , P i , b bt , t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, where t's binary representation equals b 4 b 5 , send messages ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , cid 3 , tcid 0 , tcid 1 , b bt to P j and ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , cid 3 , tcid 0 , tcid 1 to P i and S, and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P i , * from P j and ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , * , * , * , P j from P i . Otherwise, do nothing.
• Open phase: When receiving from P i a message ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P j , if the tuple cid, P i , P j , b is recorded, send message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b to both P j and S; otherwise, do nothing. Here we sketch how the F 4 ECOT functionality can be implemented in the F ECOT -hybrid model. Implementation of the Commit and Open phases is straightforward. The Prove phase is based on the following construction of a three-bit Boolean gate g using five two-bit Boolean gates. 9 Let x, y, z be the inputs to g, and let g x=b denote the two-bit Boolean gate corresponding to g when x is set to b. x=1 (y, z) ). ECOT functionality in the F ECOT -hybrid model against malicious, adaptive adversaries.
We now turn our attention to the realization of the F JGE functionality in the F 4 ECOT -hybrid model. As we mentioned above, each bit b (associated with an identifier cid) stored in F JGE is shared between P i and P j . More precisely, P i has a bit b 1 and P j has a bit b 2 such that b = b 1 ⊕ b 2 . Furthermore, each of b 1 and b 2 is a random bit by itself. Both P i and P j will commit to their bits to each other using identifier cid. To open this bit to P i , P j opens its share, b 2 , to P i , who then computes
In order to evaluate c = op
m (a, b), suppose P i holds a 1 and b 1 (shares of a and b, respectively), and P j holds a 2 and b 2 . Then, P i generates a random bit c 1 R ← {0, 1} and computes four bits o 00 , o 01 , o 10 , o 11 , which are the "candidate bits" for c 2 , P j 's share of bit c. Which bit is c 2 depends on P j 's shares a 2 and b 2 . The actual bits are computed as in the table below.
P i then commits to the bits c 1 , o 00 , o 01 , o 10 , o 11 and proves to P j the relations in the table using the F 4 ECOT Prove phase. We use m 0 , m 1 , m 2 , m 3 to denote the encodings of the functions associated with these relations. Next, P i and P j engage in a 4 1 -oblivious transfer so that P j receives bit o a 2 b 2 , which is P j 's share of bit c.
The full protocol UCJGE for securely realizing F JGE in the F 4 ECOT -hybrid model is shown in Figure 4 , with the checks for reused cid's omitted. Proof: Let A be an adaptive adversary that operates against protocol UCJGE in the F 4 ECOT -hybrid model. We construct an ideal adversary S such that no environment Z can tell with non-negligible Protocol UCJGE
1. On input commit, sid, cid, P j , b , P i chooses b 1 R ← {0, 1}, sets b 2 = b 1 ⊕ b, and sends messages ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b 1 to F 4 ECOT , and (jge-share, sid, cid, b 2 ) to P j . 2. Upon receiving (jge-share, sid, cid, b 2 ) from P i and ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j from F 4 ECOT , P j sends ecot-commit, sid, cid, P i , b 2 and open, sid, cid, P j , P i to F 4 ECOT , and upon receiving ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i from F 4 ECOT , P j outputs RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i 3. Upon receiving ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i and ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P j , P i , b from F 4 ECOT , where b = b 2 , P i outputs RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j .
• Evaluate phase:
where a 1 , b 1 are P i 's shares of bits of identifiers cid 0 and cid 1 , respectively, and sends the following messages to F 4 ECOT : ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , c 1 ecot-commit, sid, cid • 00, P j , o 00 , ecot-commit, sid, cid • 01, P j , o 01 ecot-commit, sid, cid • 10, P j , o 10 , ecot-commit, sid, cid • 11, P j , o 11 and (jge-eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , m) to P j .
P i sends the following messages to F 4
ECOT : ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid, cid • 00, P j , m 0 , ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid, cid • 01, P j , m 1 , ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid, cid • 10, P j , m 2 , and ecot-prove, sid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid, cid • 11, P j , m 3 .
3. P i sends ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid • 00, cid • 01, cid • 10, cid • 11, cid 0 , cid 1 , P j to F 4 ECOT , and upon receiving ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j cid • 00, cid • 01, cid • 10, cid • 11, cid 0 , cid 1 , outputs EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , m .
Upon receiving receipts for all the commitments and proof verification messages for
all the proofs, along with ECOT-DATA, sid, cid,
ECOT , where a 2 , b 2 are P j 's shares of bits of identifiers cid 0 and cid 1 , respectively, P j outputs EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P i , P j , m .
ECOT . 2. Upon receiving ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b 1 from F 4 ECOT , P j computes b = b 1 ⊕ b 2 and outputs DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b . Here b 2 is P j 's share of the bit of identifier cid. 
S runs a copy of A, simulating uncorrupted parties and F 4 ECOT for A. Messages received from Z are forwarded to the simulated A, and messages sent by the simulated A to its environment are forwarded to Z. S also sees the public header of all the messages from the uncorrupted parties to F JGE , and may decide when, if ever, to forward these messages. Further, S maintains a record of the shares of committed bits to F JGE held by corrupted parties. For each share of a bit of identifier cid, the record contains a tuples of the form (cid, P i , P j , b). This indicates that b is P i 's share of bit b, which is shared with P j .
S proceeds by reacting to the messages it sees.
Simulating the Commit phase: In this phase F 4 ECOT is simulated as normal. We break this phase into cases:
1. Say S sees message commit, sid, cid, P j , − on the outgoing communication tape of P i destined for F JGE . Then S chooses a bit b 2 R ← {0, 1} and sends messages (jge-share, sid, cid, b 2 ) from (simulated) P i to P j and ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , 0 from P i to F 4 ECOT . If P j is corrupted S stores (cid, P j , P i , b 2 ) and forwards the commit message to F JGE . (If P j is uncorrupted, S will store the tuple and forward the message in the simulation of P j .)
Upon P i receiving ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i and ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P j , P i , b from F 4 ECOT , where b = b 2 , S forwards RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j from F JGE to P j . (Note that if P j is uncorrupted, the commit message will have been forwarded to F JGE and (cid, P j , P i , b 2 ) will have been stored by S.) 2. Say S sees an uncorrupted P j receive messages ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , from F 4 ECOT and (jge-share, sid, cid, b 2 ) from party P i . If a corrupted P i sent the message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , b 1 to F 4 ECOT , S sends commit, sid, cid, P j , b from P i to F JGE , where b = b 1 ⊕ b 2 , and stores tuple (cid, P i , P j , b 1 ). If not, S forwards the commit message from the uncorrupted P i to F JGE (see above). In either case it stores tuple (cid, P j , P i , b 2 ). Then S sends ecot-commit, sid, cid, P j , P i , b 2 and open, sid, cid, P j , P i to F 4 ECOT . Upon P j receiving ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i from F 4 ECOT , S forwards the messsage RECEIPT, sid, cid, P j , P i from F JGE to P j .
Simulating the Evaluate phase: Again in this phase F 4 ECOT is simulated as normal, except that when it receives ecot-prove messages from uncorrupted parties the ECOT-PROOF messages get sent without verifying the relation, and a transfer causes a zero bit to be committed for the receiver, without actually performing any transfer.
We break this phase into cases:
1. Say S sees P j receive five ECOT-RECEIPT, · · · messages from F 4 ECOT , committing, say, to bits c 1 , o 00 , o 01 , o 10 , o 11 from P i , a message (jge-eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , m) from P i , four ECOT-PROOF, · · · P i , m messages from F 4 ECOT (with each m corresponding to m as in the protocol) and a message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid,
ECOT . (Assume the cid's are consistent in all these messages.) If P i is corrupted, S stores the tuple (cid, P i , P j , c 1 ). If the message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P j has not been sent to F JGE , S sends this message (or simply forwards it if P i is uncorrupted). The message EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 P i , P j , m is then forwarded from F JGE to P j .
2. Say S sees message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P j , m from an uncorrupted party P i to F JGE .
S sends five ecot-commit, · · · messages to F 4 ECOT with values equal to zero, and the ap-
, and sends the message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, · · · , P j to F 4 ECOT . When P i receives all the receipt messages, S forwards the original message to F JGE (if it has not been forwarded already, see above) and forwards the message EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 P i , P j , m from F JGE to P i .
Simulating the Open phase: We break this into cases:
1. Say S sees an uncorrupted P j receive message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , − from F 4 ECOT . If there is not already a message DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , − on the outgoing communication tape of F JGE , then P i must be corrupted, so S sends open, sid, cid, P j from P i to F JGE . In either case, S then forwards the message DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , − from F JGE to P j .
2. Say S sees message open, sid, cid, P j on the outgoing communication tape of an uncorrupted P i destined for F JGE . Then S sends a message ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P j from (simulated) P i to F 4 ECOT . Once that message is forwarded to F 4 ECOT , S forwards the message open, sid, cid, P j to F JGE . Now say a message DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , − appears on the outgoing communication tape of F JGE . If P j is corrupted, S will see the bit b in this message, and will have stored a tuple (cid, P j , P i , b 2 ). Then it can compute b 1 (and store (cid, P i , P j , b 1 )) if it is not already stored, and send the message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , b 1 from F 4 ECOT to P j . If P j is uncorrupted, S simply sends the message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , 0 from F 4 ECOT to P j .
Simulating corruptions: If A corrupts a (simulated) party P i , S corrupts P i and needs to simulate its internal state, which consists of the shares of all unopened committed and evaluated bits. For every bit b of identifier cid shared by P i and P j , S does the following.
• If (cid, P i , P j , b 1 ) is stored, S uses the share b 1 .
• If (cid, P j , P i , b 2 ) is stored, and S learns b upon corruption (because this bit was committed by P i or opened by P j , or because P j is also corrupted, and thus S can compute all bits shared by P i and P j ), S computes b 1 = b ⊕ b 2 , stores (cid, P i , P j , b 1 ) and uses the share b 1 .
• If neither tuple is stored (because this is an unopened bit from an evaluation and P j is uncorrupted), S generates b 1 R ← {0, 1}, stores (cid, P i , P j , b 1 ), and uses the share b 1 .
This concludes the description of S. It is straightforward to see that the simulation is perfect, i.e., 
Efficient and Universally Composable Two-Party Computation
In this section we show how to securely realize any adaptively well-formed two-party functionality in the presence of malicious adaptive adversaries in the F JGE -hybrid model. Our construction is similar to the constructions in [27, 26, 12] for semi-honest adversaries. However, since our F JGE functionality is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries, we are able to obtain a two-party protocol secure against malicious adversaries directly. We first review some of the assumptions about two-party functionalities we use in our paper, which are also used in [12] . We let F be an ideal two-party functionality, and we let P 1 and P 2 be the participating parties. We assume that F may be represented via a family C F of Boolean circuits, the kth circuit representing an activation of F with security parameter k. Without loss of generality, we assume the circuits are composed entirely of NAND gates. 10 For simplicity, we assume that in each activation, (1) at most one party has an input to F with at most k bits, (2) each party may receive at most k bits as output from F, (3) F is a deterministic function, and (4) the local state of F after each activation can be described by at most k bits. The initial state of F is described by k zero bits. We assume that messages sent from A to F are ignored, and there are no messages from F to A.
We note that the "deterministic function" assumption about F is without loss of generality, since we can always realize a probabilistic functionality F using a deterministic one F as follows. Assuming that F needs k random bits, then F receives a k-bit string as auxiliary input from each participating party upon the first activation, and then runs F using the XOR of these strings as the random bit string. It is easy to see that the simple protocol where each party sends a random k-bit string as the auxiliary input to F securely realizes the ideal functionality F in the F -hybrid model. 11 The following protocol Π F realizes an activation of F when P 1 sends a message to F. (The case for P 2 is analogous.) We assume that both P 1 and P 2 hold an sid as auxiliary input. When P 1 is activated with input (sid, v), it initiate a protocol with P 2 to perform a joint gate-by-gate evaluation of the appropriate circuit in C F .
Formally, they carry out the following protocol.
Initialization: When P 1 receives (sid, v), it checks if this is the first activation of F, and if so it sets up the internal state. Then it commits to its private input.
Setting up the internal state: For i = 1, 2, ..., k, P 1 sends messages commit, sid, cid i , P 2 , 0 and then open, sid, cid i , P 2 to F JGE . P 1 waits to receive the appropriate receipts. P 2 aborts if any of the bits are not zero. Effectively, P 1 commits to the initial internal state of F (which is all zeros), and by opening them immediately, it proves to P 2 that these bits are indeed all-zero. 12 Committing to the private input: For i = 1, 2, ..., k, P 1 sends messages commit, sid, cid i , P 1 , v i to F JGE and waits to receive the appropriate receipts. Here we assume that v = v 1 v 2 · · · v k . 13 P 2 simply records the receipts received from F JGE .
Gate-by-gate evaluation: For each NAND gate in the circuit, P 1 determines the commitment identifiers associated with the inputs to that NAND gate, say cid 0 and cid 1 , creates a new unique commitment identifier cid, sends message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P 2 , 1110 to F JGE , and waits for the appropriate receipt. Here m = 1110 is the encoding of the NAND operation. P 2 simply records the receipts received from F JGE .
Output: P 2 verifies from all its receipts that P 1 had F JGE perform the correct computation on the appropriate bits. Then for each output bit of F, it is either an internal state bit, or a bit addressed to either P 1 or P 2 (we have assumed that F does not communicate with A). In the former case, P 1 and P 2 do not need to do anything. They simply store the identifier of this bit, so that they can use it in the next activation. In the latter case, assuming that this bit, with identifier cid, is addressed to P 2 , P 1 sends a message open, sid, cid, P 2 to F JGE and P 2 extracts the bit b from the message DATA, sid, cid, {P 1 , P 2 }, b received from F JGE . The protocol for the case for a bit addressed to P 1 is the same, but with P 1 and P 2 switched.
Messages that are out of order are dealt with using tagging, as in [12] .
Theorem 5.1 Let F be a two-party adaptively well-formed functionality. Then Π F securely realizes F in the F JGE -hybrid model, in the presence of malicious adaptive adversaries.
Proof: The proof follows the proof of Claim 4.4 in [12] . Let A be a malicious, adaptive adversary that interacts with parties running Π F in the F JGEhybrid model. We will construct an adversary S in the ideal process for F such that no environment Z can distinguish whether it is interacting with A and Π F in the F JGE -hybrid model, or with S and F in the ideal process. S runs A (simulating the uncorrupted parties and F JGE for it), and proceeds as follows.
Simulating the communication with Z: S directly forwards any messages between Z and A.
Simulating the input stage: In this stage, F JGE is simulated normally. Say P 1 is uncorrupted.
Then when P 1 receives an input from Z, S sees a message on the outgoing communication tape of P 1 for F, but can only view the header. S does not forward this message directly, since A may corrupt P 1 at any time. S simulates P 1 for A by placing k messages commit, sid, cid i , P 2 , 0 on its (simulated) outgoing communication tape for F JGE . If A forwards all these messages to F JGE before corrupting P 1 , S forwards the original message from P 1 to F. S also waits until P 1 receives the appropriate receipts.
If P 1 is corrupted, S simply waits for A to deliver the messages commit, sid, cid i , P 2 , v i , for i = 1, 2, ..., k, from P 1 to F JGE , and then delivers a message (sid, v) from P 1 to F, where
If P 2 is uncorrupted, S simply records the receipts the simulated P 2 received from from F JGE .
If this is the first activation, the internal state for F must also be set up. If P 1 is uncorrupted, S runs the actual protocol for the simulated P 1 . If P 1 is corrupted, S waits for A to deliver the commit messages from P 1 to F JGE . If P 2 is uncorrupted, S runs the actual protocol for the simulated P 2 .
Simulating the circuit evaluation stage: In this stage, F JGE is simulated normally. Each NAND gate is computed by P 1 sending an eval message to F JGE .
If P 1 is uncorrupted, S sends the eval message specified in the protocol from the simulated P 1 to F JGE , and waits for the appropriate receipt. If P 1 is corrupted, S waits for A to deliver a message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P 1 , m from P 1 to F JGE .
Simulating the output stage: At this point, F should have sent DATA messages to P 1 and P 2 , but S has not delivered any DATA message to an uncorrupted party yet.
If P 2 is uncorrupted and has not received the appropriate receipts in the preveious stages, S simulates P 2 aborting. Now we break the simulation into cases.
1. P 1 and P 2 are uncorrupted: S sends the appropriate open messages from the simulated P 1 and P 2 to F JGE , and once an open message is received by (the simulated) F JGE , S sends the appropriate DATA message from F JGE , but with a data value of zero. (Note that the values in these messages are not seen by A and may be set arbitrarily.) Once all DATA messages have been received by (the simulated) P 1 (resp., P 2 ), S forwards the DATA message from F to P 1 (resp., P 2 ).
2. P 1 is corrupted, but P 2 is uncorrupted: S sends the appropriate open messages from the simulated P 2 . Since P 1 is corrupted, S has received the DATA message from F to P 1 , and thus knows the output bits for P 1 . So S sends a message DATA, sid, cid, {P 1 , P 2 }, b to P 1 for each output bit. Also for each open message deliver to F JGE from P 1 , S sends the appropriate DATA message from F JGE to P 2 but with a data value of zero. (Again note that the values in these messages are not seen by A and may be set arbitrarily.) Once all DATA messages have been received by (the simulated) P 2 S forwards the DATA message from F to P 2 .
3. P 1 is uncorrupted, but P 2 is corrupted: Analogous to the previous case.
4. Both P 1 and P 2 are corrupted: S simulates F JGE normally.
Simulation of corruptions:
If a (simulated) party P 1 is corrupted by A, S corrupts P 1 and needs to simulate the internal state of (the simulated) P 1 for A to match the messages sent to and received from F, and in particular, the input and output bits of the computation for P 1 . But this is straightforward, since upon corrupting P 1 , S obtains the messages sent to and received from F, and can patch the state of P 1 appropriately. The same is true for P 2 .
It is straightforward to see that the simulation is perfect, i.e., that even a computationally unbounded environment cannot distinguish the ideal process with ideal functionality F from the F JGEhybrid model with the protocol Π F .
Efficient and Universally Composable Multi-Party Computation
In this section we show how to extend the results from previous sections to securely realize any well-formed multi-party functionality in the presence of malicious adaptive adversaries corrupting an arbitrary number of parties. Our construction is similar to that in [12] for semi-honest adversaries. But, again as in the two-party case, we are able to construct building blocks that can withstand malicious adversaries, and therefore our construction is secure against malicious, adaptive adversaries directly.
In particular, we assume that there are n parties participating in the computation, which are denoted by P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n . We assume that the functionality F is represented by a family C F of Boolean circuits, the kth circuit representing an activation of F with security parameter k. Without loss of generality, we assume the circuits are composed entirely of AND and XOR gates. As before, we assume that in each activation, (1) at most one party has an input to F with at most k bits, (2) each party may receive at most k bits as output from F, (3) F is a deterministic function, and (4) the local state of F after each activation can be described by at most k bits. The initial state of F is described by k zero bits. We assume that messages sent from the A to F are ignored, and there are no messages from F to A.
In order to securely realize F, we basically follow the same approach as in the two-party case. However, we first need to extend some of our constructions from previous sections to suit the multipleparty case.
Broadcast and the one-to-many ZK functionalities
We assume an authenticated broadcast channel available to all participating parties. The channel is modeled by the broadcast functionality F BC in Figure 5 . The functionality guarantees the authenticity of a message, i.e., that no party P i can fake a message from P j . This is also the assumption used in [12] , and we refer the readers to [12, 29] for more in-depth discussions.
Functionality F BC F BC proceeds as follow, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n and an adversary S.
• Upon receiving a message (broadcast, sid, P, x) from P i , where P is a set of parties, send (BCAST-MSG, sid, P i , P, x) to all parties in P and S, and halt. Figure 5 : The F BC broadcast functionality
We also need an extension of the ZK functionality, namely the one-to-many ZK functionality, denoted by F mZK . Intuitively, this functionality allows a single prover to prove a theorem to multiple verifiers simultaneously. See Figure 6 for a formal definition.
mZK proceeds as follow, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n and an adversary S, and parametrized with a relation R:
• Upon receiving a message (zk-prover, sid, P, x, w) from P i , where P is a set of parties, if R(x, w) = 1, then send (ZK-PROOF, sid, P i , P, x) to all parties in P and S and halt; otherwise halt. We observe that the UCZK construction by Garay et al. [25] can be naturally extended to a one-to-many UCZK protocol with the additional broadcast functionality. Roughly speaking, P i (the prover) runs an independent copy of the two-party UCZK protocol with every party P j ∈ P using a unique sid, and all messages are broadcast. Each P j accepts if and only if all the conversations are accepting. It is straightforward to construct an ideal adversary S. If the prover is uncorrupted, S simply runs a multi-party UCZK simulator for every copy of the UCZK protocol. If the prover is corrupted and there is at least one uncorrupted verifier, S can extract the witness. If all parties are corrupted, the simulation is straightforward. The conversion remains efficient. Therefore we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 Under the strong RSA assumption or the DSA assumption, for every relation R that admits an Ω-protocol Π, there exists a three-round protocol UC[Π] that securely realizes the F R mZK ideal functionality in the (F CRS , F BC )-hybrid model against adaptive adversaries, assuming erasing. Furthermore, the computation complexity of UC[Π] is that of Π plus constant number of exponentiations and the generation of a signature, times the number of receiving parties.
Multi-party ECOT
We also extend the F ECOT functionality to the multi-party case, where the proof phase is replaced by a one-to-many proof and the receipts are sent to all participating parties. The functionality is denoted by F mECOT and is given in Figure 7 .
Functionality F mECOT F mECOT proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n and an adversary S.
• Commit phase: When receiving from P i a message ecot-commit, sid, cid, P, b , record cid, P i , P, b , send message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P to all parties in P and S, and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P, * from P i and all furture messages of the form ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , P i , P from any party in P.
• Prove phase: When receiving from P i a message ecot-prove, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P, m , if the following three tuples, cid 0 , P i , P, b 0 , cid 1 , P i , P, b 1 , and cid 2 , P i , P, b 2 are all recorded, and op (2) m (b 0 , b 1 ) = b 2 , then send message ECOT-PROOF, sid, ssid, cid 0 , cid 1 , cid 2 , P i , P, m to all parties in P and S; otherwise do nothing.
When receiving from P i a message ecot-transfer, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P j , P , if the following three tuples, cid 0 , P i , P, b 0 , cid 1 , P i , P, b 1 , and tcid, P j , P, b t are all recorded, send message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, b bt to P j , record tuple cid, P j , P, b bt , and send message ECOT-RECEIPT, sid, cid, P i , P j , cid 0 , cid 1 , tcid, P to all parties in P, P i , and S; and ignore all future messages of the form ecot-commit, sid, cid, P, * from P j and all future messages of the form ecot-transfer, sid, cid, * , * , * , P j , P from any party in P. Otherwise, do nothing.
When receiving from P i a message ecot-open, sid, cid, P i , P , if the tuple cid, P i , P, b is recorded, send message ECOT-DATA, sid, cid, P i , P, b to S and all parties in P; otherwise, do nothing. It is straightforward to extend the UCECOT protocol to the multiple-party case. One simply replaces the F ZK functionalities by the F mZK functionalities and replaces the point-to-point messages by broadcast messages. We denote the extended protocol by UCmECOT, and we have the following theorem. 
Multi-party joint gate evaluation
We extend the joint gate evaluation functionality to the multi-party case. Functionality F mJGE is shown in Figure 8 . The only changes with respect to the two-party case are that the receipts are sent to all participating parties, and that all parties have to agree for the opening to take place.
Functionality F mJGE F JGE proceeds as follows, running with parties P 1 , ..., P n , and adversary S.
• Commit phase: When receiving from P i a message commit, sid, cid, P, b , if P i ∈ P, then record cid, P, b , send message RECEIPT, sid, cid to all parties in P and S, and ignore all further messages of the form commit, sid, cid, P, * and eval, sid, cid, * , * , P, * from any party in P.
• Evaluate phase: When receiving from P i a message eval, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P, m , if P i ∈ P and both cid 0 , P, b 0 and cid 1 , P, b 1 are recorded, then compute b = op (2) m (b 0 , b 1 ), record cid, P, b , send message EVAL-RECEIPT, sid, cid, cid 0 , cid 1 , P i , P, m to all parties in P and S, and ignore all further messages of the form commit, sid, cid, P, * and eval, sid, cid, * , * , P, * from any party in P; otherwise, do nothing.
When receiving from P i a message open, sid, cid, P j , if P i ∈ P, P j ∈ P, and the tuple cid, P, b is recorded, then record tuple openreq, sid, cid, P j . When a tuple openreq, sid, cid, P i , P j is recorded for every P j ∈ P, then send message DATA, sid, cid, b to P i . In fact, we only need a "weakened" version of the F mJGE functionality for general multi-party computation. The weakened version, denoted by F wmJGE , has the additional constraint that only XOR and AND operations are allowed in the evaluation phase. It is obvious that since {XOR, AND} is a complete set of Boolean operations, F wmJGE is powerful enough to realize any multi-party functionality.
As in the two-party case, we also need an extension of the F mECOT functionality, denoted by F 4 mECOT , that performs 4 1 -oblivious transfer and proves relations among four bits. We only state the following theorem and omit the details. Theorem 6.3 There exists an efficient protocol that securely realizes the F 4 mECOT functionality in the F mECOT -hybrid model against malicious, adaptive adversaries.
Next, we briefly sketch a protocol UCmJGE that securely realizes F wmJGE in the F 4 mECOT -hybrid model. This protocol is essentially a multi-party extension to the UCJGE protocol. In UCmJGE, a bit b is now shared among all participating parties: party P i has bit b i such that n i=1 b i = b mod 2. In the following description, we omit some details in the protocol such as the format of the messages and the identifiers of the bits. These details should be clear from the context. mECOT , sends bits b j to party P j for all j = i. Then each P j commits to b j through the F 4 mECOT and opens it to P i immediately.
Evaluate phase: Assume the two bits to be computed are a and b, and P i holds bits a i , b i as their shares. Naturally we have a = a i mod 2 and b = b i mod 2. We assume the result bit is c and each party should hold a share c i at the end of this phase. We consider two cases according to the operation performed.
XOR:
To compute the XOR of bit a and b, each party simply computes c i = a i ⊕ b i . No messages are needed.
AND:
To compute the AND of bit a and b, we follow the approach in [26, 12] . Observe that AND is the multiplication modulo 2, and we have the following equality.
(see [26] for the justification of this equality). Therefore, each party P i can compute n ·a i ·b i by itself, and each pair P i and P j can jointly compute (a i + a j ) · (b i + b j ) as in the two-party case, by invoking multiple transfer phases of the F 4 mECOT functionality.
Open phase:
To open a bit b, shared as b = n i=1 b i , to party P i , every P j opens its share b j through F 4 mECOT . Then P i sums up all the shares to obtain b.
Abort: In case any party aborts and/or deviates from the protocol, all parties abort the protocol.
Theorem 6.4 Protocol UCmJGE securely realizes functionality F mJGE in the F 4 mECOT -hybrid model against malicious, adaptive adversaries.
The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.2. Next, for any multi-party functionality F, we construct a protocol Π F that securely realizes F in the F mJGE -hybrid model. The construction is almost identical to the two-party case, except that since we assume the circuit computing F consists of AND and XOR gates, instead of NAND gates, the gate-by-gate evaluation will invoke the F mJGE functionality with different encodings of functions.
Theorem 6.5 Let F be a multi-party adaptively well-formed functionality. Then Π F securely realizes F in the F mJGE -hybrid model, in the presence of malicious adaptive adversaries.
The Strong RSA assumption. The Strong RSA assumption is a generalization of the standard RSA assumption which (informally) states that given an RSA modulus N and an exponent e, it is computationally infeasible to find the e-th root of a random x. Informally, the strong-RSA assumption states that it is infeasible to find an arbitrary non-trivial root of a random x.
More formally, we say that p is a safe prime if both p and (p−1)/2 are prime. Then let RSA-Gen(1 k ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that generates two random k/2-bit safe primes p and q, and outputs N ← pq. The Strong RSA assumption we introduced by Barić and Pfitzmann [1] , and has been used in several applications (see [23, 17] ). It is a stronger assumption than the "standard" RSA assumption, yet no method is known for breaking it other than factoring N .
The Paillier cryptosystem and the Decision Composite Residuosity assumption. The Paillier encryption scheme [34] is defined as follows, where λ(N ) is the Carmichael function of N , and L is a function that takes input elements from the set {u < N 2 |u ≡ 1 mod N } and returns L(u) = u−1 N . This definition differs from that in [34] only in that we define the message space for public key pk = N, g as [−(N − 1)/2, (N − 1)/2] (versus Z N in [34] ), and we restrict h to be 1 + N . The security of this cryptosystem relies on the Decision Composite Residuosity Assumption, DCRA.
For key generation, choose random k/2-bit primes p, q, set N = pq, and set h ← 1 + N . The public key is N, h and the private key is N, h, λ(N ) . To encrypt a message m with public key N, h , select a random α ∈ Z * N and compute c ← mod N , and the decryption is m if m ≤ (N − 1)/2, and otherwise the decryption is m − N . Paillier [34] shows that both c λ(N ) mod N 2 and g λ(N ) mod N 2 are elements of the form (1 + N ) d ≡ N 2 1 + dN , and thus the L function can be easily computed for decryption.
B Constructing Ω-protocols
We present the detailed constructions of some Ω-protocols in this paper. We first describe the detailed construction of the Ω-protocol for proving knowledge of discrete logarithm by Garay et al. [25] . We present an efficient Ω-protocol for R in Figure 9 . The common reference string consists of two parts: (1) a Paillier public key pk = N, h where N is an RSA modulus and h ∈ Z * N 2 with N |order(h), and (2) another RSA modulus with 2 generators Ñ , h 1 , h 2 . The prover and the verifier share a common input y, while the prover also knows x, such that g x = y. In the first message, the prover sends an encryption of x using the Paillier encryption key pk. Then a Σ-protocol is used to prove that the plain-text in the Paillier encryption is indeed the discrete log of y. A technical difficulty is that the discrete logarithm and the Paillier encryption work in different moduli. To overcome this, a known technique of adding a commitment to x using two generators (h 1 , h 2 ) over a third modulusÑ of unknown factorization [6, 8, 23, 31, 25] was used.
Since the techniques used in the protocol is rather standard, we omit the proof of security for simplicity.
Next, we present an Ω-protocol for proving knowledge of partial equality of representation, PEREP(x 0 , g 0 , g 1 , x 1 , g 2 , g 3 ). See Figure 10 . 2 modÑ Figure 9 : Ω-protocol for the discrete log relation R DL = {((y, g), x) : y ≡ g x mod p}. Common reference string is a Paillier public key and a Strong RSA modulus along with two generators ((N, h), (Ñ , h 1 , h 2 )).
